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Public Law
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Henry G. McMahon*
This subject, as one of the constantly expanding fields of the
law, normally produces each year a number of interesting cases
presenting novel problems. The past term, however, cannot be
considered as one of the vintage years of local government law,
as there were few cases of this character.
Two cases, with points of some interest and importance, involved the validity of paving assessments.' In City of Alexandria v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R. Co., 2 the defendant resisted the judicial enforcement of the municipality's paving lien
on a number of different grounds, the more important of which
were the contentions (1) that its property did not abut the street
which had been paved; (2) the assessment was arbitrary and
unreasonably discriminatory; and (3) the paving of the street
did not benefit the defendant's property in any way, but on the
contrary, aided the defendant's competitors. The basis for the
first defense was that a narrow strip of land, varying in width
from one and a half to two feet, separated the paving from the
defendant's property. This the court parried by pointing out
that since the city had maintained this strip, along with the remainder of the street, for more than three years, there had been
a tacit dedication thereof to the city for street purposes; and
that consequently the defendant's property did abut the street.
For good measure, the court pointed out that furthermore actual
physical contiguity of the street and the property was not required by law. The defense that the paving assessment was arbitrary and unreasonably discriminatory was rejected by the
court, which pointed out that the assessment was on the basis of
front footage on the paved street, and that this method of assessment had been repeatedly held valid and constitutional. The
third defense was met with proof that while the paving might
not benefit the property while used for the purposes for which
*Professor and sometime dean, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. City of Alexandria v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 240 La. 1025, 126
So.2d 351 (1961) ; City of Alexandria v. Shevnin, 240 La. 983, 126 So.2d 336
(1961).
2. 240 La. 1025, 126 So.2d 351 (1961).
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the defendant railroad was then using it, this property had a
high potential value as sites for warehouses, and its utility for
such a purpose had been increased by the paving. Further, the
court pointed out that it was now settled that an owner of abutting property could not assail the validity of a paving assessment
on the ground that the improvement did not actually benefit his
property.
The second case on the subject, City of Alexandria v. Shevnin,- involved the validity of a paving assessment levied in connection with a project initiated by a petition of abutting property owners. The enforcement in rem of the paving lien was
resisted on the ground that the persons signing the petition for
three of the property owners had no authority to do so; and that
without these three property owners, the petition did not have
the requisite number of signatories. The municipality countered
with two arguments: (1) that the unauthorized acts of the persons who had signed the paving petition without authority had
since been ratified by the respective property owners; and (2)
the defendant, knowing of the performance of the work and not
attempting to enjoin it, was now estopped to assert the invalidity
of the paving assessment. Holding that the defect was jurisdictional, rather than an informality or irregularity, and under the
controlling statutory provision, 4 the court held the assessment
invalid, insofar as it affected defendant's property. This case
illustrates the dangers to which a municipality is subject in paving projects initiated by a petition of property owners, where
the apparent majority of property owners is a narrow one. Perhaps in these cases, the municipality should refuse to incur the
risk, and have the paving done under the statutory provisions
authorizing the governing body itself to initiate and to require
such work.
The importance of Smith v. Ascension-St. James Bridge &
Ferry Authority5 is due more to the vistas which it opens up for
the financing of toll bridge and road projects within the present
constitutional framework than to any question of law considered.
The defendant authority, created by gubernatorial proclamation
3. 240 La. 983, 126 So.2d 336 (1961).
4. LA. R.S. 13:2843 (1950), providing in part that "The plea of estoppel shall
never be allowed in matters of local or municipal assessments where there are
radical defects in the proceeding leading up to the local assessments, but the plea
shall have full effect as against mere subsequent irregularities or informalities
therein where no protest has been made thereto."
5. 241 La. 806, 131 So.2d 902 (1961).
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pursuant to a special statute,6 entered into a contract with the
Louisiana Department of Highways in which the authority
agreed to construct a toll bridge across the Mississippi River at
Donaldsonville, and the highway department bound itself to contribute $5,300,000 towards the costs of construction over a
twelve-year period. To finance the total cost of construction, the
authority bound itself to issue $30,000,000 of revenue bonds, secured by pledges of future toll revenues and the contributions to
be made by the highway department.
The suit, brought by four qualified electors and taxpayers,
sought to have this contract held invalid, and its performance
enjoined. The only question of any particular importance which
was raised was the plaintiffs' contention that the highway department had no authority to enter into the contract; and that
its agreement to contribute $5,300,000 in the future over a
period of twelve years was a violation of the constitutional prohibition against the creation of state indebtedness. Express constitutional authorization for the highway department's contributions was found by the Supreme Court; 7 while no provisions
of the organic law were found to inhibit the express statutory
grant of power to the highway department to enter into such a
8
contract.
In the past term, the Supreme Court failed to meet its normal
quota of cases raising questions of the validity of municipal
ordinances. It decided only two cases in this area. In the first
of these, 9 the boundary fence provisions of a municipal building
code' were held constitutional. In the other," a village ordinance prohibiting the sale of any alcoholic beverages whatsoever
was held to be an ultra vires violation of the Local Option Statute,' 2 insofar as it prohibited the sale of beer having an alcoholic
content of less than 3.2% by weight.
6. LA. R.S. 48:1091 et seq. (1950).
7. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 23(4), the provisions creating and regulating the
Long Range Highway Fund.
8. LA. R.S. 48:1152 (1950).
9. Polizzi v. Lotz, 240 La. 734, 125 So.2d 146 (1960).
10. Art. 4502, Building Code of New Orleans.
11. Randolph v. Village of Turkey Creek, 240 La. 996, 126 So.2d 341 (1961).
12. LA. R.S. 26:588 (1950).

